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Civil Society at the Crossroads in Southeast Asia 1 
 
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt2 
 
 
 
The costly and work-discouraging welfare apparatus in the West is beginning 
to strike “at the authority of the democratic system.” OECD 1994; for too 
long Western rights advocates have tended  to equate social progress with the 
growth of a welfare state, measuring commitment by gross social spending.3 
 
There is no such thing as society, only individuals and their families. 
 
(Margaret Thatcher) 
 
 
With the end of the Cold War, civil society together with democracy and the 
market became the new global denominators for neo-liberal change and more or 
less a panacea for virtually all the problems in both South and North: “In the 
world of ideas, civil society is hot. It is almost impossible to read an article on 
foreign or domestic policy without coming across some mention of the 
concept.”4  The sentiments of euphoria about civil society were almost omni-
present at the new international ideological agenda in most cases presented as a 
new type of ‘anti-politics’: It became part and parcel of the doublespeak 
intended to impose a mental and ideological colonization of the world by 
introducing new categories intended to present a harmonious world and 
depoliticise social change.5 Aiding in the rise in popularity of civil society was 
the movement from authoritarian to more democratic regime forms all over the 
globe. This was observable not only in the former Soviet-type socialist societies, 
but also in Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil, and Central America. In almost all of 
sub-Saharan Africa where unions, women=s organizations, student groups and 
other forms of popular activism provided the empirical foundation for stirring 
accounts of the role played by resurgent and often rebellious civil societies in 
triggering the demise of many forms of dictatorship.6 These transformations, in 
turn, encouraged the rise of the alluring but problematic notion that if an 
invigorated civil society could force a democratic transition, it could consolidate 
democracy as well,7 and this gave renewed prominence to the view that 
democracy is good for development and may be a casual factor in its own right. 
 
In Southeast Asia, the situation was a bit different although some authoritarian 
regimes like Indonesia collapsed in conjunction with the aftermath of the 
financial crisis but on the other hand it seems that the dictatorship in Myanmar 
and one-party rule in Vietnam, and Laos are experiencing only gradual or 
virtually no sign of opening up access to other political forces’ potential 
influence on decision-making and the political system in general. The region is 
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composed of a diverse mosaic of various types of regimes and might together 
with China and North Korea be considered one of the last strongholds of non-
democratic political systems although with important variations between what 
some scholars refer to as soft authoritarianism (Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia) to full-fledged democracies, Westminster style or American style, in 
Thailand and the Philippines, respectively. The overall benchmark of the 
political evolution of the region in the past two or three decades show that the 
situation is fluid and could change tomorrow! 
 
Strong government vested with the responsibility of upholding collective needs, 
an absence of many liberal democratic practices, and longevity of political elites 
seems to be the norm. Singapore, for example, has been ruled by the People’s 
Action Party since independence, and under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew 
between 1959 and 1990. The ruling Golkar party of Indonesia, with the support 
of the military, won all elections since 1975 until the Suharto regime was 
toppled in 1997. A similar longevity of power has been experienced by the 
United Malays National Organization in Malaysia, and even the recruitment of 
the elite in Thailand has come from the same circles and the recent harsh anti-
democratic measures by the Thaksin government are signs of a renewal of 
autocratic policies.8  
 
Even if societies are legally considered democratic there has not been complete 
freedom for opposition parties, freedom of speech, a separation of powers, or 
civil and political rights.9 In societies where the emphasis is upon consensus and 
harmony, especially as an ideologically legitimising device with reference to 
economic growth, it has proved possible to deem opposition as subversive. 
Cultural values have been a tool to control dissent and the role of civil society 
has been curtailed to marginalisation. It has been widely by argued by some 
Asian leaders that free market development precedes democracy and civil rights, 
as indeed it did in the West. 
 
The rethorics about Asian values,10 which temporarily seemed to fade away in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis, are being recycled to legitimize 
authoritarian tendencies for instance in relation to the so-called war on terror. 
Former PM of Malaysia, Mahathir referred already in 1996 to the debate for 
being defensive in nature, and then actually reinforced it by declaring: “It was 
right and about time that Asia too was accorded the regard and high esteem that 
was its due.” He went on to say, “that there was a belief among many in the 
West that their values and beliefs were universal; that the advocates and 
champions of Asian values were merely justifying oppression, dictatorship and 
uncivilized behaviour.”11 This was reinforced in late summer 2001 with 
reference to the infamous Internal Security Act (ISA), when the Malaysian 
police arrested 10 members of the Kumpulan Mujahiddeen Malaysia (KMM). 
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They were accused of having links to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to 
have connections in Ambon, Indonesia, where they were said to be fighting with 
local militants. “The fact that six of the detainees were also members of PAS 
was utilized as evidence against the biggest opposition party, in an attempt to 
unveil its hidden and subversive political agenda.”12 
 
However, “the people whose political and other rights are involved in this 
debate are not citizens of the West, but of Asian countries. The fact that 
individual liberty may have been championed in Western writings, and even by 
some Western political leaders, can scarcely compromise the claim to liberty 
that people in Asia may otherwise possess.”13 What is important here is the 
strange alliance between the supporters of Asian values and conservatives in the 
West which implies a convergence between the illiberal social agenda of the 
post-Washington consensus and the specific type of benevolent autocracy which 
seemingly has been reinvented as a response to ‘terror’. The re-emergence of 
authoritarian practices in the region might prove to have serious consequences 
for NGOs, labour and social movements. 
 
This paper examines the debate about civil society in a comparative political 
economy perspective.14 Its main approach relies on two inspirations: One is the 
famous assertion by Karl Polanyi that markets do not evolve organically but are 
instead the creations of vested interests.15 Another is the assertion by Karl Marx, 
“that free competition is the final form of the development of productive forces, 
and thus of human freedom, means only that the domination of the middle class 
is the end of the worlds history - of course quite pleasant thought for yesterdays 
parvenus.”16 The first part focuses on the competing theoretical definitions and 
assumptions about civil society, democratization and social change; the second 
part explores the attempts by civil society actors to impact conflicts over 
resources and distribution of welfare in Southeast Asia; the third section focuses 
on the conflictual relationship between civil society organizations (CSOs)17 and 
the state and various types of regulations, laws and contractual relationships, and 
finally the need for social reform is emphasized as one important type of social 
resistance against the downsizing of the social and public sector=s provision of 
collective goods. 
 
 
Linking civil society, democratization and social change 
 
Civil society and democratization are often presented by liberal theorists as a 
separate positive category opposing dictatorship and protectionist markets. 
However, the distinction of state/market/civil society is implausible. The market 
is constructed and constrained by the state and the civil society. The state is a 
reflection of both the market and the civil society. And the civil society is 
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defined by the state and the market. One cannot separate these three modes of 
expression of actors’ interests, preferences, identities, and wills into closed 
arenas about which different groups of people will make scientific statements. 
There are no clear demarcations between the three analytical categories on the 
contrary there are clear overlaps and it is in the borderlands between the three 
that conflict occurs. 
 
However, the concepts of civil society and democratization are also the history 
of social meaning in practice. It has been the history of the social invention, both 
at a scholarly level but also in practice, of the twin concepts as a continual 
process and of the modification over time of what civil society and 
democratization means. In some cases ideas about civil society are being used 
for specific goals, as clearly demonstrated in the post-Cold War anti-politics 
device accomplished by the IFIs and the Washington consensus,18 but also by 
the launching of the anti-globalization movement where there have been 
tendencies to lump together all segments of society and organizations into one 
category as long as they resist globalization. 
 
Scholars differ considerably in their assessments and ideas of the forms and 
extent of civil society=s influence in politics and economic policy-making, but it 
is clear that in one way or another civil society matter. They also seem to differ 
in their conceptualizations and theorizing about the location of civil society in 
broader social analysis and how to define and distinguish civil society from 
market-based actors and state related institutions. 
 
To be sure, confusion about the precise meaning of civil society is part of the 
allure and lore of the concept=s long history.19 Over the years, philosophers as 
diverse as Ferguson, Tocqueville, and Gramsci have appropriated the concept of 
civil society to articulate particular points of view about the relationship 
between state and society.20 It is possible to trace its origins back to the 
philosophical writings of political economists like Locke and Hegel and also 
more contemporary scholars like Gellner and Habermas. 
 
It has been suggested to divide present day thought on civil society into four 
competing views: The associational school, the regime school, the neo-liberal 
school, and the post-Marxist school.21 
 
The associational school=s definition of civil society refers to “that arena where 
manifold social movements ... and civic organizations from all classes ... attempt 
to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express 
themselves and advance their interests.”22 This is inspired by Tocqueville as it 
indicates a growing consensus among scholars about civil society as part of 
democratization but understood as a conflictual process. The definition also 
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deviates from the classical liberal notion by either assuming or hiding much that 
we will have to explain or uncover by portraying civil society as a highly 
politicized space occupied by actors from all social classes. “The gulf that 
separates classical liberal and modern notions of civil society suggests that one 
must make choices in defining and deploying the term, especially when it comes 
to integrating it into actual policy making.”23 
 
Critics from the regime school who draw inspiration from Locke and the neo-
liberal angle, however, making civil society synonymous only with moralizing 
civilised organizations, debate the concept by stripping it of its analytical utility. 
Equating civil society with high-minded groups renders the concept a 
theological notion, not an analytical category. On this background the concept 
automatically includes the mafia, the triads, and semi-fascist movements who 
then would belong to civil society, since they also seek to advance citizens= 
values. To further complicate the picture we could also include: tribal and 
kinship groups, name groups (as with the Chinese), guru-oriented groups, and 
traditional secret societies.24 Take also a number of Islamic groups who reject 
the rule of law and support violence25 or the movement who supported former 
President Estrada’s return to power in Manila by trying to takeover the 
Malacanang presidential palace unmasked “the dark side, the dark twin” of the 
much-vaunted Philippine-style ‘people power’ which had earlier inspired 
democratic political movements around the world. The protests, which some 
analysts say brought the Philippines to the brink of civil war, prompted Arroyo 
on May 1 to declare a ‘state of rebellion’.26   
 
On this background it seems that both liberal and conservative writers on civil 
society who see civil society as a non-political zone of social intercourse based 
in the free market and dominated by the bourgeoisie have failed to provide an 
adequate account of how poverty and the welfare state affect civic and political 
engagement and their argument that economic freedom automatically produces 
democracy and prosperity has not been empirically verified. The experience 
from East and Southeast Asia suggests that a weak civil society in many cases 
was a precondition for the insulated developmental state and the concomitant 
high economic growth. The neo-liberal version of civil society, and social 
capital for that matter, fails to address properly either capital or the social, and it 
tends to set aside issues of power and conflict.27 There is furthermore a tendency 
in the literature to romanticize civil society as the ideal on behalf of its counter-
part the state and this relationship is often presented as a zero-sum game. 
 
The problems inherent in post-Marxist notions of civil society are not that 
different from the critique of the neo-liberal theorists. Many scholars have 
tended to see economic growth and development as a precondition for a vibrant 
civil society and democracy. There are significant exceptions in the writings of 
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Gramsci who introduced the concept of hegemony and who saw civil society as 
a sphere occupied by struggle for material, ideological and cultural control over 
all of society, including the state. Therefore passive or moral resistance becomes 
an inherent part of civil society’s battle for and against capitalism. What matters 
are ideology, power, political and legal institutions. 
 
It leaves us with a number of interesting conclusions. First of all, whatever the 
relationship between democratization and civil society it remains a contextual 
and empirical issue to judge its potential impact on the polity and also whether it 
might be able to mobilise resources that the state is unable to do. Second, it can 
co-exist with authoritarian state structures and also can or cannot be an 
impediment for the development of markets. Third,28 the ‘global demand for 
democratization’ emanating from civil society is an inescapable part of popular 
discourses and not a specific European phenomenon or invention exported by 
the West. This popular demand for citizens rights is not only related to the state 
and its institutions, nor is it simply a demand for the rights to organize in trade 
unions, to strike, or a matter of gender equality, but part of a global discursive 
process directed towards a more egalitarian distribution of resources. It is: “the 
organized efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions on 
the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such 
control,”29 and “(a) belief that democratic ideas and practices can only in the 
long run be protected if their hold on our political, social and economic life is 
deepened.”30 Fourth, the question about civil society and democratization is not 
only related to national citizens or civil rights, but also to the question about 
autonomous representation. In the end, this cannot be reduced to a purely 
legalistic issue, although as will be shown below civil society is always legally 
sanctioned by the state, but must be put in conjunction with the legitimacy 
devoted to the rights of civil society organizations to engage in political activity. 
 
Throughout history “the present almost universal and inclusionary concept of 
citizens’ rights was only brought about through pressure and agitation by and on 
behalf of those who were initially excluded or marginalized from the territorial 
political community.”31 Therefore efforts at social ‘levelling’ will be met with 
stiff resistance, even if attempted through democratic institutions. This is the 
theme of one seminal work on the ebb and flow of political opposition in 
Southeast Asia. The authors are conspicuous about the Left as a force which has 
been significant in “giving much momentum to the development of non-state 
political space.”32 They furthermore makes the important point that civil society 
is not a new phenomenon but rather a historical product of political struggles 
mainly performed by leftist forces which were curtailed or blocked through the 
actions of repressive governments and military force. The following attempts to 
link these observations with the new social policy of the post-Washington 
consensus which deliberately “uses the liberal language of participation and 
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empowerment as a strategy of ‘anti-politics’ that marginalises political 
contestation. Unlike earlier governance programs identified with structural 
adjustment, this new governance discourse envisages a more active role for the 
state as a regulator for civil society seeking to promote the disciplines of the 
market.” With examples from the aftermath of the financial crisis in Thailand 
the maintenance approach developed by the IFIs was to devote a specific and 
strengthened role of civil society organizations and the ideological imperative as 
the pre-eminent measure to ameliorating the social impacts of crisis, along with 
‘flexible’ labour markets.33 It leaves us with the important question whether civil 
society is undermining the key functions and social responsibilities of the state 
in terms of delivering public collective goods. The fact that the IFIs policy of 
dumping social services to voluntary organizations means they should take over 
the work without a corresponding transfer of funding and the development of a 
mutual relationship with the state denotes a peculiar situation almost without 
any corresponding elaboration in theory.34 
 
These issues lead to the challenge of examining the intricate links between civil 
society, democratization and attempts to impact existing socio-economic 
policies on privatization of social sectors and deregulation of labour markets in 
Southeast Asia. In addition, the paper investigates the links between labour and 
civil society understood as the competing interests at stake and the coalescence 
of social forces forming around policy-making. In the end it is a struggle over 
societal control over resources as they are performed by “the locus of range of 
inequalities based on class, gender, ethnicity, race, and sexual preference.”35 
 
 
Civil society and its impact on socio-economic policy-making 
 
It is not easy to encompass all of Southeast Asia as the region is extremely 
heterogeneous in terms of historical evolution, geographical size ranging from a 
small city-state to the fourth most populous country in the world; in historical 
perspective and accordingly each country’s colonial legacy, and not least its 
concomitant composition of the relationships between the state and civil society. 
Likewise, economic parameters denote a very diversified picture in terms of the 
region having a country belonging to OECD standards to some of the poorest 
societies in the world.36 
 
As a result of the reliance on export orientation for several decades the 
incorporation into the world market of capitalist countries in Southeast Asia has 
been extremely rapid although the financial crisis clearly illustrated the 
vulnerability of heavy dependency on external markets, actors and institutions. 
Together with the expansion of increasingly complex social structures the region 
has also experienced profound social inequalities, uneven development, and 
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poverty has increased to such an extent that there are both external and domestic 
pressures on the political system and economic policy-makers to take action.37 
 
This part of the paper is divided into five sections. The historical lack of a role 
for academia, critical theory and sociology in the region has played a decisive 
role in terms of the radicalization of social movements in the 1930s up to the 
1960s and 1970s when the Left and social democratic forces finally were 
eliminated in tandem with the end of the Vietnam war and the influence of anti-
communist laws and repression. The emergence of CSOs in the beginning of the 
1970s and 80s must be understood in light of the end of the Cold War and the 
de-radicalization of the Left. Subsequently one can argue that civil society in 
non-socialist Southeast Asia emerged as a response to the decline of the old Left 
and the dissolution of ‘real-existing socialism’. In a way, civil society has 
attempted in many cases to fill the gap where weak and repressed trade unions 
have been unable to gain major victories in terms of influencing the policy-
making process. This highlights the necessity to focus on distributional issues 
and the links between formal unionism and labour activism on the one hand and 
CSOs on the other. The next part focuses on conflict and control over resources 
not only environmental, but also agrarian change and land ownership. Next 
comes the issue of injustice, political and human rights which are closely related 
to democratization and recently also the so-called war on terror. Finally, the 
section closes by examining how identity politics, ideology, ethnicity and gender 
related issues shape the new emerging NGOs and other movements and class 
representation in civil society. 
 
That there is a close relation between the role of academia, intellectuals and not 
least students and the issues at stake in organizing civil society make it 
necessary to do a brief historical detour to explain the views of the scholarly 
community and critical studies on social change and civil society. The middle 
class, especially its intellectual and educated strata, has privileged access to the 
institutional bases of civil society and mobilization of popular forces in 
democratization which makes it necessary to understand their role.38  
 
In his seminal work on the role of sociology understood as the description, 
analysis and understanding of social relations King notes that, compared to other 
regions of the world, sociology in Southeast Asia has not in historical 
perspective been particularly extensive or distinguished.39 Also Taylor and 
Turton note that the region is of outmost importance and is socially complex yet 
local contributions have lacked in their broader horizon and explanations.40 
 
Although the reasons might be pretty straightforward, as King mentions, war 
and conflict in Indo-China, and Burma/Myanmar, have limited access for 
foreign scholars and critical studies were almost nonexistent until recently, 
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where slowly it has become possible to gather data and do field work and collect 
empirical information. But also in capitalist Southeast Asian countries we had to 
wait until a few decades ago before critical commentary entered the agenda.41 
As one of the mavericks of Southeast Asian studies noted in 1995, “It is a 
curious phenomenon, by no means limited to Southeast Asia, that as a system 
becomes successful and entrenched it also becomes more subject to question.”42 
This was exactly what happened as the situation changed considerably in the late 
1990s and in the new millennium where there has been a virtual explosion in the 
expansion and diversification of civil society and also the academic community 
has become vigorous and engaged in terms of taking initiative and supporting 
the rise of new social movements and NGOs. “They are almost always based on 
educated and very often on university-connected cadres. These NGOs have 
generally aimed at establishing or supporting moral communities whose 
boundaries do not mirror those of the state apparatus, which is seen as a source 
of repression rather than the font of legitimacy. At one level, this is part of a 
transnational movement away from faith in the state, which is no longer seen as 
willing or able to safeguard basic social and economic concerns (as well of 
course, as a loss of faith in political parties as a source of remedy). At another 
level, the emergence of NGOs is a response to the failure of Southeast Asian 
states to dominate the vast changes over which they preside, and in particular to 
adjust to the rapid expansion and changing priorities of the middle classes. The 
current appreciation of the virtues of private over public ownership reflects the 
same attitude, however, different its social sympathies may be.”43 Especially 
after the financial crisis in Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia there are 
clear tendencies that social movements and NGOs have attempted to recreate an 
independent political space outside the reach of the state entities. 
 
In connection to this it is important to stress that the old Left did have a relative 
strong intellectual base among students, and scholars and did receive moral and 
ideological support, and in many cases they even participated in the armed 
struggle, but there was a lack of pertinent and critical scholarship on a larger 
scale. The implication is that “the historical evidence contradicts the assumption 
that the development of civil society in capitalist societies is a progressive and 
incremental outcome of economic growth. Rather, civil society has ebbed and 
flowed in the region throughout this century.”44 A similar thesis is raised by 
Deyo in his attempts to examine the role of working class organizations in 
historical perspective. Labour influence on economic politic, at least in 
Thailand, has been more important up to new political reforms and less 
influential in the institutionalisation phase.45 
 
That there are clear links between trade unions and civil society illustrates the 
point made above about the blurring lines between state, market and society. It 
has been possible for labour, even under authoritarian regimes, to influence 
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policy-making and implementation, “in many cases through community-based 
political mobilization only loosely linked to trade unionism. Labour’s 
oppositional potential became especially evident during interludes of political 
crisis and government transition”46 
 
Although they share a sceptical view of civil society Hutchison and Brown do 
ask the potent question: “What effects does the NGO involvement in the labour 
arena have on workers’ capacities to self-organise in the region?”47  The answer 
varies from country to country, but in Indonesia NGOs can act outside the legal 
constraints applied to trade unions through legal advice, training and funding. 
What is of interest, however, is the involvement international NGOs, social 
movements and trade unions who in a number of cases have had a determining 
impact on issues related to labour in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines the KMU 
social movement unionism is an attempt to articulate commitment beyond 
narrow workers= interests and devote attention toward social change at the 
societal level. This has been done through alliances with other sectors of society 
and international solidarity networks and touched upon a whole series of issues 
from campaigning against US bases, to resistance against the World Bank and 
the IMF conditionalities on Filipino economic policy-making, and strikes 
against the accompanying privatization and deregulation measures. It is safe to 
say that “while not all NGOs are politically radical, in Southeast Asia, many 
have experienced a degree of radicalization.”48 
 
In Thailand there are several examples of strong collaboration between labour 
and popular sector groups. In the private sector blue collar workers have been 
able to obtain very favourable agreements with the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Welfare for retrenched workers and improved severance pay legislation 
under the Labour Protection Act. Accordingly, as the consequences of the crisis 
unfolded, NGOs and academics have played an important in agitating for 
improved health and safety regulations especially for female workers. “In part 
too, academics and NGOs have helped to consolidate a more unified opposition 
to reforms, denationalization, and austerity. A case in point is the United Front 
to Return Privatization to the People to evoke a referendum on the Enterprise 
Corporations Act.”49 There are also many examples of successful campaigns, at 
least indirectly, with external partners like ILO and INGOs but in other cases 
there are major disagreements on political vision and interests. For instance with 
regard to the issue of migrant labour where the NGOs traditionally uphold a 
supportive role while trade unions tend to see migrants as threats to wages and 
jobs. 
 
The political influence of labour in the region has been and is still dependent on 
cross-sectional support in civil society for instance in Thailand it was primarily 
community activists who lobbied for improved health and safety regulations at 
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the workplace after the tragic fire at the Khader factory in 1995 where 188 
workers lost their life.50 One explanation for this is the weak level of labour 
organization and civil society is able to get access to the media or collaborate 
with foreign NGOs and thereby create pressure on the government. 
 
In-house unionism in Malaysia, strongly encouraged by the Malay government, 
has not led to democratization of labour legislation in Malaysia but nevertheless 
in some cases workers in firms with in-house unions have enjoyed better work 
conditions than workers organized in national unions.51 The most important 
aspect of the popular sectors’ interest in labour issues has been attempts to 
provide protection for migrant labour. There have been joint campaigns between 
the MTUC and several NGOs for a minimum wage, but similar to the Thai 
situation there are significant differences as well. There are instances where the 
trade unions have argued against the government=s policy of keeping the door 
open for migrants, who number approximately one million mainly Indonesian 
workers, while NGOs are more defensive. 
 
After years of human rights abuses and widespread corruption during the reign 
of the Suharto government, Indonesian unions are now playing a more active 
role. A diverse number of 67 independent national unions and NGOs across 
Indonesia launched a campaign to promote the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work. At the national level, the trade union agenda has 
been dominated by the issue of law reform. More important than legislation is 
the ability of workers and their organizations to ensure that legislation is 
enforced. This in a country where the GNP has contracted by 50 percent, and 
being plagued with all sorts of communal violence. About 100 million people 
have been moved back into Third World level poverty after being drawn out of 
it during 30 years of growth. Furthermore the democratic transitions are 
controlled by the middle class and elite leaving very little room for influence of 
civil society and labour. 
 
These instances of full trade union rights have yet to be realized, as most 
countries have not yet ratified the core Conventions of ILO. In the guise of so-
called labour market flexibility, the security of the livelihood of workers is being 
threatened through contractualisation and sub-contracting and other innovations 
in working arrangements such as work sharing, individualized production quota 
and incentives systems as well as rotating contracts. Of all Southeast Asia, only 
the Philippines, Burma/Myanmar, and Indonesia ratified ILO Convention No. 
87, which respect the right to self-organization. ILO Convention No. 98, which 
provide for the right to collective bargaining, was only ratified by Philippines, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.  Even as these ILO Conventions were 
ratified, the labour legislation is inadequate and in most cases circumvented to 
promote the interest of employers and the governments as well.  
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The role of civil society in terms of influencing social issues has as illustrated 
above in many cases led to increased social control. Labour and independent 
trade unions attempt to increase the proportion of collective goods to the 
benefits of workers and the poor have been met with outright suspicion at best 
but worse it has also led to repression or more sophisticated types of inclusion.  
“The institutionalized incorporation of labour into the structures of the state is 
now well advanced throughout the region, and the existence of independent 
labour organizations is everywhere threatened.”52 The weak collective 
bargaining strength of the labour movements is not only a consequence of 
political restraint but these controls are now requirements of the heavy reliance 
on export orientation (EOI) and the neo-liberal downsizing of the public sector 
all over the region. 
 
Labour has had some success in campaigning against economic liberalization 
and privatization especially in the beginning of the 1980s in Thailand and the 
Philippines although the latter case compares more with Latin America where 
developmental sequencing resulted in a shift from corporatism to non-unionised 
labour markets. The 1997 financial crisis also acted as a catalyst for renewed 
attempts to increase social insurance programs and other benefits for workers 
and the poor. However, social coverage in the region is still well below the level 
predicted by the region’s better off countries GDP per capita, urbanization rate 
and development of the formal sector. Unemployment insurance is virtually 
absent.53 The only country which differs from this is Malaysia where social 
coverage is broader and more diversified compared to the other countries, but 
this is not because of pressures from trade unions and NGOs but rather part of 
UMNOs strategy. 
 
The reasons are well known according to the race-to-the-bottom thesis which 
indicates that global competition and especially competition from low-wage 
countries in China, Cambodia and Vietnam have led to the introduction of 
flexible labour markets, but without government investment in collective goods 
like training, R & D, physical infrastructure and social insurance. Lack of 
effective government support for minimal labour standards, adequate wages and 
benefits, and fair employment practices encourage companies to compete 
through labour-cost reduction and union avoidance.54 Static flexibility ensures 
the existence of a floating workforce and labour market deregulation has in this 
way become a more effective policy than direct repression to avoid labour unrest 
and grievances regarding social welfare benefits from the public sphere. 
 
Now briefly turning to the role of advocacy groups it is probably not a 
coincidence that until the September 11 incident US development aid has gone 
primarily to this sector. USAID=s main focus has been on advocacy NGOs, less 
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on other parts of civil society, such as religious organizations, labour unions, 
social and cultural groups, associations based on identity (such as clan or ethnic 
associations), or service delivery NGOs. Perhaps most insightfully, is USAIDs 
uncritical romance with the “benevolent Tocquevillean vision” of civil society, 
as an idealized, inordinately American perspective that is not widely shared even 
in other Western democracies: a civil society characterized by “the earnest 
articulation of interests by legions of well-mannered activists who play by the 
rules, settle conflicts peacefully, and do not break any windows.”55 
 
Examples are found all over the region especially in Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines of those who advocate “greater public accountability and 
transparency in government who seek to eradicate official corruption and other 
obstacles to a modern, efficient capitalist economy.”56 Even business can benefit 
from the existence of advocacy groups since it at least indirectly legitimize their 
entry into politics. “...The structurally rooted elimination of labour from 
democratic politics under regimes of ‘exclusionary democracy’ has enhanced 
the usefulness to business of parliamentary institutions, thus creating a critical 
political base for those institutions.”57 
 
The environmental NGOs in Southeast Asia have been greatly strengthened and 
been able to gain major victories in a number of important cases.58  Together 
with rapid industrialization, competition for the rural resource base, and the 
decline in agrarian unrest the region has opened up spaces for political activity 
and expression among the ‘hitherto excluded’.59 During the past decades NGOs 
in Thailand have also been very active in political movements and was a major 
force together with workers in the opposition of the Suchinda military junta in 
1992.60 Institutional bases of environmentalism have multiplied and in 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and in the Philippines they have mushroomed and 
diversified in character. 
 
The anti-large dam movements in Indonesia and Thailand have conducted fierce 
resistance together with national and international NGOs and local inhabitants in 
Kedungombo and the dams build or supposed to be constructed in the Mekong 
river delta. Resistance has been rooted in the soil of material struggles over the 
means of livelihood.61 
 
CSOs along ethnic and religious lines have also emerged. As described in 
Hirsch and Warren examples are legion all over the region where loggers or the 
state in the name of >nation-building= threatens the livelihoods of indigenous 
people. The Dayak forest-dwellers in Sarawak and in Mindanao, the Philippines 
are cases in point where the internationalization of civil societies has blossomed 
with INGOs direct intervention and collaboration with indigenous groups. This 
has also happened in Laos and Vietnam where it is the impact of INGOs which 
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have stimulated debate and public discourse over various contentious issues. In 
the Philippines basic Christian community movements seek to establish a self-
sustaining economy based on local agriculture and supported by local industry, 
and in Thailand Buddhist-based movements both have established CSOs 
working for self-reliance and have had a direct influence on Thai politics. 
 
A final aspect concerns the diasporic Chinese communities in Thailand, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia have established Rotary and Lions clubs 
which are almost exclusively ethnic Chinese. Together with clan-associations 
they execute a tremendous influence on economic policy-making and in some 
cases they have determined the outcome of national elections.62 
 
The ideological underpinnings of broadening involvement ranges from notions 
of social justice to various middle class-based movements and in some cases, 
especially in Thailand, religious symbols and representations serve as a focal 
point not only for environmental NGOs but for many other groups as well. 
 
 
Structure of the Legal Framework Legislation in East and Southeast Asia 
 
As suggested in the previous section, governments have traditionally exerted 
strong legal controls over the establishment and oversight of NGOs in the 
region. Statist law is still the dominant mode of control and management of civil 
society. Managerial and regulated rules mean that actors in civil society are not 
autonomous but are both in and out of the state, “and therefore, it may be said 
that the state manages civil society. The key to understanding the emergence of 
this managerial civil society is seen in the vertical linkages between state and 
other civil actors.”63 With the important exception of the Philippines the state 
has been able to exclude those who are considered unacceptable, but as 
illustrated above, a new type of socio-economic regulation has emerged where 
the state virtually delegates power and competence to NGOs and thus 
“producing an organizational hybrid of state and civil society.” 64  
 
East and Southeast Asian regimes have been characterized by having “...their 
qualities of governance in common irrespective of motley constitutional 
characteristics. Whatever regime title, whatever the legal structures, whatever 
the voting arrangements if any, whatever citizen rights might be formally laid 
down, all have in practice functioned as exercises in >top down consensus= by 
persuasion and/or imposition.”65 In practice it means that the question about 
either co-optation or exclusion of CSOs by governments cannot be 
underestimated both historically and in the present period. In comparison, and in 
parallel with basically the same reasons, this is illustrated by the low level of 
organized labour unions which either have been excluded from policy-making 
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by the state as in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and in Thailand or 
incorporated into the state and party realm in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and 
Myanmar.66 The situation in the Philippines differs from the rest of the region in 
the sense that legislation has been more liberal, especially after the ousting of 
the Marcos regime, and there has been more political space for autonomous 
action and organization.67 
 
The legal and fiscal environment in which labour and civil society thus operates 
varies greatly between countries in the region. In recent years, the governments 
of the Philippines and Thailand have moved toward creating a more supportive 
or in the latter case inclusionary environment. This means that in the Philippines 
CSOs in some instances have been able to influence public policy, partner with 
government in the implementation of development programs and design a 
system for the self-regulation of the sector. CSOs in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore, in comparison, have been subject to close supervision and guidance 
by the state. This has limited the scope of their actions.68 Similar trends can be 
seen in Myanmar, where different dictatorships crushed the re-emergence of 
civil society in March 1988 where a spontaneous protest against perceived 
injustice erupted into a popular upsurge against authoritarianism during the next 
four months. The ban on independent unions and political organizations was 
breached and this was followed by a plethora of student unions, trade unions, 
associations, and class and mass organizations.69 It ended in September with a 
military coup and a return to repression. 
 
Today there are more than five hundred NGOs in Cambodia including six major 
human rights NGOs. They are responsible for dispersing more than 50 percent 
of technical assistance from external donors and have in many cases taken on 
quasi-government functions. It means that the borderline between what is state 
and public sector responsibilities and what is the prerogative of private 
institutions is at best blurred. One a scholar notes that, “Civil society in 
Southeast Asia, serves the dual purpose of providing logic for resistance in the 
face of the onslaught of the state, or logic for coping in the face of its absence or 
neglect.”70 Also, at the regional institutional level there is scepticism toward 
civil society as can be seen by the lacking of reference to CSOs and institutions 
by ASEAN in its declarations and statements. Also the guidelines for achieving 
accreditation are limiting and the parameters for consultation and participation 
available to civil society are restricted.71 Again the Philippines tend to have an 
advanced approach as seen in the suggestion in 2000 of key civil society 
spokespersons suggestion to reinvigorate ASEAN with a social dimension. 
Whether this will lead to a more equal relationship at the regional level remains 
to be seen. 
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The weakness of CSOs in Laos and Vietnam is a function less of state repression 
and more because of the events that have enveloped the historical trajectories of 
these countries. The national project for consolidating society is now focused on 
rebuilding the polity and economy after years of war and violence. The state 
rebuilding policies in these countries have lead to the adoption of reformist 
policies as well as the emerging important role of external donors. In Vietnam, 
civil society is re-emerging and while the state has attempted to limit its growth, 
there is evidence that it is not very successful. In Laos, there are strong 
community structures but no legal framework that enables the registration of 
CSOs. 
 
In Burma and Laos INGOs are collaborating with local CSOs in poverty 
alleviation programs aimed at increasing food production and improving health 
and education. These organizations are also involved in strengthening the 
capacity of local organizations and micro-credit projects. No legislation exists 
and the relationship between development CSOs and the state is unclear. 
 
This is further exacerbated, because the majority of CSOs in the region rely on 
external funding for their activities. The Prime Minister in Thailand has for 
instance tried to discourage foreign donors from funding civil society.72 This 
move was reportedly blocked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, and in 
the end the government did not attempt to dissuade foreign donors. Amnesty 
International is concerned that these government statements about NGOs could 
be construed as veiled threats against their legitimate peaceful activities.  
 
On the other hand, as this section has suggested, a slight trend towards lessening 
of controls is occurring at least superficially, although occasionally CSOs are 
accused of 5th-column activities, sometimes with reference to their links with 
external forces which in many cases are determining their activities. There are 
very large numbers of CSOs in the Philippines, Thailand and especially 
Indonesia who lost their funding from US and Australian donor who shifted aid 
to terror related activities overnight and now fund conflict prevention, human 
security projects and the like. 
 
Under section 88 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, non-stock (not-for-
profit) corporations may be formed. Although informal organizations exist, they 
do not have full legal status. A not-for-profit corporation is the only type of legal 
entity permitted for CSO in the Philippines. 
 
Much of the legal framework for CSOs in Vietnam is in regulations or 
administrative practice and not in laws. The 1957 “Law on Association” and the 
later Civil Code (1996) regulate the sector with scant detail. The Civil Code 
recognizes three types of entities: social and socio-professional organizations; 
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social and charitable funds, and other organizations. In the main, these are 
closely connected with the Party or with mass organizations, such as the 
Vietnam Women’s Association.  
 
In Thailand, the National Police Office Bureau has responsibility for 
establishment and oversight of associations, and the Ministry of the Interior has 
responsibility for foundations under the Civil and Commercial Code established 
in 1992. One ministry - the Cultural Commission - oversees and approves the 
substantive activities of CSOs, and another agency - the Ministry of the Interior 
or the National Police Office Bureau - regulates all other aspects of their activity 
At present, though, Thai NGOs are working with the government to devise a 
new and more appropriate set of regulations for the sector and various drafts 
have been prepared.  
 
Throughout the region, governments retain the right to dissolve CSOs and 
foundations for vague and politically-determined reasons, such as “operating 
against the interests of the state” (Vietnam); “for being managed in a manner 
contrary to public order, good morals, or the security of the state” (Thailand); or 
“being used for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare, or good order” 
(Singapore).73 
 
This means that regulation of both associations and foundations has been highly 
subject to government discretion. In a recent survey, the major problems with 
the general legal framework for CSOs in Southeast Asia  (except in the 
Philippines) are the following:74 
 
• Dual authority for establishment and oversight, which results in: a). 
excessive government control over which types of NGOs are permitted to 
exist (resulting in the virtual exclusion of advocacy organizations in many 
cases); and b). excessive bureaucracy for NGOs seeking to carry out their 
activities.  
 
• Intrusive regulation and administrative discretion, which results in: a. 
arbitrary treatment of NGOs that seek to carry out activities that the 
government does not like; and b. lack of independence for NGOs.  
 
Gradually, however, this situation is changing. The lack of a requirement for 
permission from a relevant ministry in the Yayasan law in Indonesia seems 
clearly preferable to a mandatory two-track system. In addition, the negotiations 
between government and NGO leaders in Thailand indicate that governments 
are beginning to listen to NGO representatives about the need for legal reform 
that will allow the sector to operate more freely.75 This is though contradicted by 
several commentators who see >intellectuals= close to the state who “‘eat’ 
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oppositional forces by appropriating, influencing and developing potentially  
progressive ideas in order to sideline radical projects and reconstruct national 
ideology.”76 Suddenly the term civil society is everywhere in government plans, 
journals of line-ministries and even in quasi NGOs which act more or less on 
behalf of the state. In tandem with the heavy involvement of the IMF and the 
World Bank in Thai planning and economic policy-making the state has 
changed its vocabulary and discourse by now officially relying on Good 
Governance including  ‘People’s participation’ and social policy. Suddenly, 
CSOs have become instruments through which national development should be  
implemented through partnership and potential co-optation. This is essentially 
the anti-politics agenda where the IFIs and the Washington consensus 
appropriate discourses on participation, empowerment, social capital, and civil 
society and redefines them into their own discourse and interest. What we have 
seen in Thai policy-making is a spill-over effect of the anti-politics agenda by 
the establishment of a new social contract which initially was supported by 
progressives and labour. “The new social contract involves the protection of 
domestic capital by the government of the remaining rich, while delivering 
increased social protection to the poor.”77 Some element of the contractual 
relationship between the new Thaksin government and the poor were housing 
projects, there were loans for the poor and the 30 baht health scheme to go to 
hospital if people were not covered by private insurance. It turned out to be very 
expensive to implement with the consequence that the government merged the 
scheme with other programmes such as the Worker=s Compensation and Social 
Security funds which led to major protests by workers.  
 
The limited and circumscribed nature of civil society in East and Southeast Asia 
has meant that private law plays a less significant role than in Western Europe. 
The circumscribed role of private law has meant that law has been identified 
with the operation of public law and the consequence of that is “that law is 
associated with the extension and management of state power rather than 
providing a framework for private contractual relationships” i.e. a statist form of 
legalism.78 
 
Furthermore, the enabling environment for giving has improved in some 
countries in Southeast Asia in recent years, a culture of giving to organizations 
beyond religious institutions is little developed. What’s more, with tax 
avoidance still a problem in some countries, tax incentives do little to influence 
the decisions of the wealthy on their philanthropic contributions. 
 
Popular sector groups are neither fully understood nor entirely trusted by the 
government and business sectors in Southeast Asia. There is a challenge as yet 
unmet by civil society to strengthen public understanding and acceptance of 
CSOs and their roles in society. In Indonesia, foundations are still figuring out 
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how best to position themselves given that the term yayasan became somewhat 
tainted in the public’s eyes under the rule of Suharto, who, along with his family 
and cronies, has been accused of using foundations to launder money.79 
 
It appears that the liberal dictum of law and legalism requires a liberal state and 
an autonomous civil society which is on the defensive at the present time of 
writing. 
 
 
Emerging social resistance for social reform 
 
Some of the key findings of this paper are related to the new strategies of anti-
politics originally developed by the Washington consensus in an attempt 
appropriate progressive concepts and sensitive political projects. The meaning of 
privatization of social policy management is to remove functions traditionally 
performed by the state, placing them in the private sphere. The World Bank and 
the IMF have co-opted the language of progressive civil society and locked it 
inside the neo-liberal discourse as a strategic move against the current which 
consist of relatively speaking vocal and  powerful anti-globalization movement 
which many Southeast Asian civil society organizations identify with. On the 
other hand, the Asian financial crisis spelt the end of neo-liberal globalization 
and today the IFIs are under increased double pressure from both global and 
local civil society forces but also from the neo-conservative anti-multilateralist 
in the White House and in the Treasury. 
 
At the moment this cleavage does not lead to significant increases in social 
welfare benefits in Southeast Asia. What might prove more important then are 
factors which have not been touched upon in this paper, for example changing 
demographies, changing gender perceptions and roles, social atomization of the 
family including more divorces and more individualism. All this means that the 
family or women to be more precise as the last resort social safety net is under 
retrenchment and rapidly being reconfigured to a new type of institution.80 
 
National social policy understood as a set of institutions and programs duly 
articulated by a strategic set of medium- and long-term social goals. On the 
political agenda, social policy is not as relevant as other public policies and is 
still being subordinated to the economic growth imperative. Reforms have only 
been initiated because of the pressure and conditionalities from the IFIs who 
acted on behalf of international capital’s fear that social chaos and havoc would 
put their investment into jeopardy. 
 
Although there are encouraging examples of victories won by CSOs especially 
in Thailand and the Philippines there is also considerable fragmentation of civil 
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society. Encouraged by the global restructuring of production which fragments a 
labour force, formerly unified through comprehensive collective bargaining and 
class consciousness the new demands of flexible production and labour markets 
have decreased the strength of workers. This has implicitly meant that CSOs in a 
number of situations either act on behalf of labour or collaborate with non-
unionised workers or more informally with the established trade unions. 
 
Finally, there is a tendency towards CSOs either taking over state and public 
sector responsibilities but always with a significantly lower budget or they might 
even act against the interests of those who support increases in collective goods 
and social redistribution. In away they tend to deflect responsibility away from 
the state and as long as workers don’t have any political representation in 
accordance with their class interests this might not be a sustainable strategy in 
the long run. The very act of defining themselves as has ‘non-governmental’ 
explicitly rejects any ambition for establishing an alternative hegemonic project, 
which would, by its nature, have to include states and governments as the means 
through which political and economic power is articulated in modern societies.81 
 
A weakening civil society also tends to alienate people from their political 
institutions. People lose confidence in politicians not only from evidence of 
widespread corruption and arrogance but also (and more specifically linked to 
the globalization effect) from a conviction that politicians do not understand and 
cannot resolve the major problems confronting their societies such as 
unemployment and decline of public services.82 The old civil society was 
formed in large part around interest groups like industrial and professional 
associations and trade unions, and also around co-operatives and charitable or 
self-help organizations. More recently, these older components of civil society 
have been diluted by a greater emphasis on ‘identities’ defined by religion, 
ethnicity, and gender, and also on ‘locality’ rather than wider political 
authorities. “The integration of the vast majority of countries of the world into a 
single economy represents at once the self-justifying reversion of capitalism to 
its own nature, and its intensifying penetration of the whole world. All the 
reasons for dismantling social security, for the neglect of welfare nets and for 
the further marginalisation of the poorest are now justified, not in the name of 
‘capitalism’, but under the banner of ‘integration’, the institutionalising of a 
partnership in which the participants are profoundly unequal and destined to 
remain so.”83 
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